La doppia negazione del senso. Levinas contro il nichilismo

Abstract

The article deals with the issue of nihilism and non-sense starting from Emmanuel Levinas’s thought and from his comparison between being and nothing as it is outlined, from the earliest works, in the concept of the il y a. This comparison will lead Levinas in search of escape from the non-sense of the il y a from otherwise than being, which is the responsibility towards the other man (the levinasian “ethics as first philosphyâ€). The focus of the article is the analysis of the concepts of non-indifference and disinterest, which are discussed in the last part of the article. The ultimate goal is to think of a dimension of sense that does not deny non-sense, but indicates its presence at the very bottom of the ethical relationship, danger and possibility of an authentic relationship of non-indifference with the other man.