La refutación del Nihilismo en Tiempo y Ser: Heidegger repensando a Parménides
How to Cite
Oñate, T. (2020). La refutación del Nihilismo en Tiempo y Ser: Heidegger repensando a Parménides. Teoria. Rivista Di Filosofia, 40(1), 91–102. https://doi.org/10.4454/teoria.v40i1.90
English title: Refutation of Nihilism in “Time and Being”: Heidegger’s Re-interpretation of ParmenidesThis article addresses the new interpretation of the didaskalic poem of Parmenides enabled by Heidegger in his lecture Time and Being [also in the Summary of a Seminar on that lecture]. Focusing specially on the statement: “For thinking and being are the same” [Gar tò auto estí noeîn kaì eînai]. In order to this, Being without beings has to be thought proceeding through no subject sentences: «It gives Being». «It gives Time». «It gives Time and Being» [Es gibt Sein. Es Gibt Zeit. Es gibt Zeit und Sein]. This allows Heidegger to outline the ontological difference between two ranges-regimes of language related to the intensive-indivisible scope of Being, on one hand, and to the extent-divisible of beings, on the other hand. To conduct this, the procedure required consists in a methodological nihilism: Being is not a being. Time is not a being, which denies the ontological nihilism: There isn’t not-Being in the differential scope of Being-Time. Thus resulting in the Das Ereignis doctrine: (ex)apropiatory happening belonging, at the same time, to the (true) Time and the (true) Being as Alétheia: ontological truth. All this requires to think how Das Ereignis is not, taking into account the essential role undertaken by the Léthe of Alétheia and the Possible Absence (restraint, retreat, reserve) as withdrawal or di-fferentiation of not-giving which encourage the giving of the gift. Thus, the simplification and the equalisation of Being to beings and of Time to present time is avoided.