Vol. 39 No. 2 (2019): The Prismatic Shape of Trust 2. Authors and Problems

Method and Philosophical Proposition in Kant and Hegel

Giulio Goria
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele

Published 2019-12-17


  • Transcendental proofs,
  • Speculative proposition,
  • Synthesis a priori,
  • Dialectical method

How to Cite

Goria, G. (2019). Method and Philosophical Proposition in Kant and Hegel. Teoria. Rivista Di Filosofia, 39(2), 221–238. https://doi.org/10.4454/teoria.v39i2.79


My aim, in this paper, is to discuss the role of the propositional form as expression of the logical-linguistic essence of philosophy. To this end, I will make a comparison between Kant’s and Hegel’s perspectives, using for Kant transcendental proofs, analyzed in Methodenlehre’s «Discipline of Pure Reason». For Hegel I will examine the passage expounding the “speculative proposition” in the Preface of Phenomenology of Spirit. My first aim is to point out the role of judgement’s propositional form, at the one hand, for the relationship between synthesis a priori and its propositional expression articulated in Critique of the pure Reason and, at the other hand, for the dialectical movement of the proposition itself that – according to Hegel – is the “speculative in act” (das wirklich Speculative), nothing but the articulation and exposition of the interdipendency of propositions on each other. There is no doubt that Kant and Hegel propose two different analysis of logical capacity of philosophy. These differences are based on two dissimilar objects of philosophical knowledge, as transcendental and speculative synthesis a priori. But there is a common element between reason’s transcendental reflective knowledge of its own procedure and speculative proposition as meta-theoretical reflection on our linguistic capacities. This main common aspect is the role of the propositional practice (praxis) in the philosophical knowledge. It cannot be experienced or judged by understanding; but what kind of experience is it possible for it? To point out this problem – that is the problem of reason’s discursive capacity of self-knowledge – is our second aim in this paper.