Vol. 40 No. 2 (2020): Philosophy of Translation. An Interdisciplinary Approach

Husserl and the Allsubjektivität’s point of view

Filippo Nobili
Università di Pisa

Published 2020-12-19


  • Husserl,
  • Phenomenological Idealism,
  • All-Subjectivity,
  • Self-Explication,
  • Self-Responsibility

How to Cite

Nobili, F. (2020). Husserl and the Allsubjektivität’s point of view. Teoria. Rivista Di Filosofia, 40(2), 233–243. https://doi.org/10.4454/teoria.v40i2.114


To appreciate the significance of phenomenological idealism as traditionally unprecedented, I shall provide a clarification of the too often overlooked notion of Allsubjektivität. Husserl’s effort to resolve classical philosophical oppositions – such as those between naive objectivism and psychological subjectivism, theory and practice, etc. – results in the idea of transcendental (all) subjectivity’s self-explication (Selbstauslegung). I will argue that, on closer inspection, Husserl’s idealism does not consist in a metaphysical worldview but, rather, it coincides with the accomplishment of a concrete task, according to which true being emerges as a practical idea of cooperative determination. Indeed, the procedure of Auslegung reveals how the tension among the world, the I and the others coalesces and how a higher degree of self-awareness (Selbstbesinnung) amounts to a correlative boost in human self-responsibility (Selbstverantwortung) for reason’s achievements.