

Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge

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Introduction

Until recently, the philosopher who represented the virtue ethical tradition was mainly only Aristotle. David Hume was sometimes mentioned as a virtue theorist, but he was either considered as an eccentric exception within the modern ethical tradition¹, or his name was mentioned only to brush it aside soon after². Hume has not been seen as providing a distinguishable and independent model for virtue ethics until recently. Today, though, the interpretation of Hume's moral theory as a form of virtue ethics has become well established³. However, interpreters diverge on how to properly understand Hume's virtue ethics. Here I would like to briefly sketch the reasons that make Hume a virtue ethicist, and contrast Hume's

¹ See J.B. Schneewind, *The Misfortunes of Virtue*, in «Ethics», 101 (1990), 1, pp. 42-63.

² It is the case of Philippa Foot, who removed the name of Hume as a representative of virtue ethics from the second edition of her essay *Virtues and Vices*. See P. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, in P. Foot, *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1978, and Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, pp. 1-18.

³ See e.g. R. Cohon, *Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, ch. 6; R. Crisp, *Hume on Virtue, Utility, and Morality*, in S.M. Gardiner (ed.), *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2005, pp. 159-178; S. Darwall, *Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics*, in «Noûs», 27 (1993), 4, pp. 415-448; J. Driver, *Ethics: The Fundamentals*, Blackwell, Oxford 2007, ch. 8; D. Garrett, *Hume*, Routledge, New York-London 2015, ch. 8; L. Greco, *Toward a Humean Virtue Ethics*, in J. Peters (ed.), *Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective*, Routledge, New York-London 2013, pp. 210-223; P. Russell, *Hume's Anatomy of Virtue*, in D.C. Russell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 92-123; C. Swanton, *Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?*, in «Hume Studies», 33 (2007), 1, pp. 91-113; J. Taylor, *Hume*, in L. Besser-Jones, M. Slote (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics*, Routledge, New York-London 2015, ch. 12.

approach to the more established neo-Aristotelian one. After having presented the features of Hume's morality that make it a form of virtue ethics, I shall suggest what I believe is the direction that a reading of Hume as a virtue ethicist should take⁴.

1. *The Elements of Hume's Virtue Ethics*

What are the elements that make Hume's conception a form of virtue ethics for all intents and purposes, and why are they refuted by neo-Aristotelians⁵?

To begin with, it is Hume himself that presents his approach as one focused on the virtues. In a famous passage from *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* Hume says that

[w]e shall analyze that complication of mental qualities, which form what, in common life, we call Personal Merit: We shall consider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or sentiment or faculty, which, if ascribed to any person, implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his character and manners. (EPM 1.10; SBN 173-74)⁶

This allows us to provide a "catalogue" (EPM 1.10; SBN 174) of virtues

⁴ Given the limited scope of this essay, I shall not provide a full account of the numerous contemporary positions within the Humean ethical framework, and shall only outline the main reasons why for me Hume is in fact a philosopher with a lot to teach us about the theory of virtue. Likewise, I shall here talk in terms of "neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics", without going into details of the various versions of it that are discussed in today's philosophical debate.

⁵ In *Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues*, in R. Crisp (ed.), *How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996, pp. 1-18, Roger Crisp distinguishes between "virtue theory" and "virtue ethics". According to Crisp, "[v]irtue theory is the area of inquiry concerned with the virtues in general; virtue ethics is narrower and prescriptive, and consists primarily in the advocacy of the virtues" (p. 5). Here I shall refer to "virtue theory" and "virtue ethics" as synonym, and I shall understand "virtue ethics" the way defined by Crisp.

⁶ I shall quote *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* as EHU and *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* as EPM in the body of the text, followed by section, paragraph, and SBN with the page in the Selby-Bigge edition (I shall refer to *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975, and also to the editions of EHU and EPM edited T.L. Beauchamp, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999 and 1998). I shall quote *A Treatise of Human Nature* in the body of the text as T followed by book, part, section, paragraph, and SBN with the page in the Selby-Bigge edition. (I shall refer to the edition of the *Treatise* edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, and to the edition edited by D.F. Norton, M.J. Norton, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2007).

and vices by observing human beings in their activities and in the relations they have with each other. This is in line with Hume's ambition of supplying a "science of human nature" (T Intro.9; SBN xvii-xviii) based on empirical grounds.

Moreover, Hume makes it clear that it is not actions that we primarily assess, but rather the character traits that produced them:

If any *action* be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never consider'd in morality. (T 3.3.1.4; SBN 575)

In turn, these virtuous or vicious character traits compose unitary characters that represent the basic objects of moral evaluation. There are various passages from Hume's philosophical works to which one can refer in this regard⁷. Besides, *The History of England* can be read as the work in which Hume's conviction regarding the centrality of characters for ethics is put to the test by examining human affairs as they develop in a historical context⁸.

Given Hume's attention to virtuous and vicious character traits, and to those very unitary characters of which those traits are parts, personal upbringing and character development become elements of the greatest importance, making the issue of moral education another piece of Hume's virtue ethical outlook⁹. For example, this is what Hume says regarding the acquisition of the central virtue of justice:

⁷ See T 2.1.7.5; SBN 296; T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471; T 3.3.1.5; SBN 575; T 3.3.1.19; SBN 584; T 3.3.1.30; SBN 591; EPM 9.10; SBN 276; EPM 9.25; SBN 283; *The Sceptic*, in D. Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, E.F. Miller (ed.), Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1987, pp. 159-180, p. 170; *A Dissertation on the Passions*, in D. Hume, *A Dissertation on the Passions. The Natural History of Religion: A Critical Edition*, T.L. Beauchamp (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford 2007, 2.14, p. 9.

⁸ D. Hume, *The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688*, 6 vols., Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1983. On the relations between Hume's morality and *The History of England*, see A. Sabl, *Hume's Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford 2012; D.T. Siebert, *The Moral Animus of David Hume*, University of Delaware Press, Newark 1990. See also J. Harris, *Hume: An Intellectual Bibliography*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, that devotes two chapters, chs. 6 and 7, to the *History*.

⁹ Note that for Hume education is important, but doesn't represent the sole element in moral development, since human nature has in itself specific moral sentiments that are independent of education. See EPM 5.3; SBN 214. On the role of education in Hume, see D. O'Brien, *Hume on Education*, in «Pacific Philosophical Quarterly», 98 (2017), S1, pp. 619-642.

As publick praise and blame encrease our esteem for justice; so private education and instruction contribute to the same effect. For as parents easily observe, that a man is the more useful, both to himself and others, the greater degree of probity and honour he is endow'd with; and that those principles have greater force, when custom and education assist interest and reflection: For these reasons they are induc'd to inculcate on their children, from their earliest infancy, the principles of probity, and teach them to regard the observance of those rules, by which society is maintain'd, as worthy and honourable, and their violation as base and infamous. By this means the sentiments of honour may take root in their tender minds, and acquire such firmness and solidity, that they may fall little short of those principles, which are the most essential to our natures, and the most deeply radicated in our internal constitution. (T 3.2.2.26; SBN 500-501)

All these features – the necessity of compiling a catalogue of virtues and vices, the focus on character traits as composing virtuous or vicious characters over actions, the role of education – make Hume's virtue ethics similar to Aristotle's. Also, the appeal to empirical observation of human beings can be understood in Aristotelian terms, insofar as Aristotle as well moved from observable data to present a picture of human nature in which virtue and vice played an integral part. However, the Humean way of doing this departs from the Aristotelian one in a crucial aspect. In the case of Hume, there is no appeal to any final cause whatsoever. It is true that virtue and vice enter for Hume in the description of what human nature consists in. However, for him virtue and vice emerge from a rigorously *a posteriori* analysis of human beings that doesn't presuppose any *telos* intrinsic to human nature. The Humean picture doesn't move from any pre-established conception of the good for human beings from which to determine virtue and vice, and thus to assess human conduct, independent of those pleasures and pains that human beings happen to feel. According to Hume, in fact, "moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and [...] whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious" (T 3.3.1.3; SBN 574-575).

In this sense, Hume's virtue ethics is sentimentalist. Virtue and vice are functions of sentiments of approval and disapproval felt by human beings, and these in turn depend on feelings of pleasure and pain. Hume's sentimentalism has a critical impact on Hume's virtue ethics. According to Hume, human nature is framed in sentimental terms. Ultimately, human actions are not determined by reason. They are instead the result of passions that represent the sole motivational drives. True, Hume observes that

“*reason and sentiment* concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions” (EPM 1.9; SBN 172). However, when we think that our conduct is guided by reason, we are actually moved by “calm passions”, which allow us to organize our lives according to long-term goals (see T 2.3.3.8; SBN 417; EPM 6.15; SBN 239-40)¹⁰.

Not only reason doesn’t move people to action. Reason doesn’t help determine the ends people pursue either, which again are left to desires people have, given their individual characters and preferences. As Hume observes in another passage of *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*,

[i]t appears evident, that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by *reason*, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependance on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man, *why he uses exercise*; he will answer, *because he desires to keep his health*. If you then enquire, *why he desires health*, he will readily reply, *because sickness is painful*. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a reason, *why he hates pain*, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object. (EPM App 1.18; SBN 293)¹¹

The Aristotelian formula whereby “rational choice is either desire-related intellect or thought-related desire”¹² doesn’t seem to hold for Hume.

2. A Non-Relativistic Subjectivism

Given Hume’s commitment to describing human nature in such terms, it is legitimate to ask if his virtue ethics ends up being a form of subjectivism. Does his sentimentalism commit him to this position? And if it does, is this something negative¹³? Hume’s sentimentalism has been un-

¹⁰ See also D. Hume, *A Dissertation on the Passions*, cit., 5.4, pp. 24-25.

¹¹ This is how Hume continues: “Perhaps, to your second question, *why he desires health*, he may also reply, that *it is necessary for the exercise of his calling*. If you ask, *why he is anxious on that head*, he will answer, *because he desires to get money*. If you demand *Why? It is the instrument of pleasure*, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress *in infinitum*; and that one thing can always be a reason, why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection” (EPM App 1.18; SBN 293).

¹² *Nicomachean Ethics*, Revised Edition, R. Crisp (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, 1139b.

¹³ This is Foot’s conclusion; see her *Hume on Moral Judgement*, in P. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, cit., pp. 74-80.

derstood in numerous and contrasting ways¹⁴. Notwithstanding the attempts that have been made by some contemporary Humeans to show that Hume's morality isn't in fact subjectivist¹⁵, it seems to me that it is. However, the reason why it can be said to be so needs clarification. Insofar as Hume's virtue ethics hinges on the notion of character, then I believe it is correct to present it as subjectivist, since it is the case that the characters of individuals differ given the variations of their subjective personalities, and these, in turn, are determined by sentiment and not by reason. Moreover, it is also the case that individuals show characters that are a *mix* of virtues and vices¹⁶. As I said, when it comes to morals Hume looks at people's characters in their entirety. What matters for him is the appraisal of human beings as possessors of laudable or contemptible characters, not of virtues and vices taken in isolation. Those characters are combinations of virtuous and vicious traits that don't have necessarily to cohere with each other, and that are assessed by *a posteriori* standards.

Given that Hume's virtue ethics is distinguished for being an ethics of character thus conceived, it makes sense to call it subjectivist. This being the case, some have discarded it since they believe that it lacks both a clear and distinct criterion to discern virtue and vice, and a convincing definition of the agent as a model for conduct¹⁷. By being subjectivist, Hume's virtue ethics is also relativist – so the story goes – and thus incapable of accounting for the objectivity of ethics in any persuasive way. Is this result inevitable?

¹⁴ As a way of example, one just thinks of Michael Slote's ethics of care, or the response-dependent, pluralist virtue ethics developed by Christine Swanton. See M. Slote, *The Ethics of Care and Empathy*, Routledge, London-New York 2007; C. Swanton, *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, and *The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche*, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester (West Sussex) 2015.

¹⁵ It is the case of Swanton. See *Can Hume Be Read as a Virtue Ethicist?*, cit., and *The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche*, cit.

¹⁶ See J. Driver, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-158; E. Frykholm, *A Humean Particularist Virtue Ethic*, in «Philosophical Studies», 172 (2015), pp. 2171-2191; L. Greco, *Toward a Humean Virtue Ethics*, cit.; D. O'Brien, *Hume, Intellectual Virtue, and Virtue Epistemology*, in A.L. Anton (ed.), *The Bright and the Good: The Connection Between Intellectual and Moral Virtues*, Rowman & Littlefield International, London 2018, pp. 153-168; P. Russell, *art. cit.* Christian Miller has recently developed a form of virtue ethics based on mixed character traits. See C.B. Miller, *Moral Character: An Empirical Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, and *Character and Moral Psychology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014.

¹⁷ Besides Foot, see R. Hursthouse, *Virtue Ethics and Human Nature*, in «Hume Studies», 25 (1999), 1-2, pp. 67-82; J. Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, chs. 6-7.

Not really. According to Hume, when we judge a character trait as virtuous or vicious, our judgment is not given from our personal, situated point of view. On the contrary, we adopt a “steady and general”, or “common” point of view (T 3.3.1.15-16 and 30; SBN 581-82 and 591; EPM 9.6; SBN 272) that allows us to express judgments that can be recognized and accepted also by others. Going into details of how the common point of view of morality comes to be determined would require more space than is here available¹⁸. I limit myself to observing that for Hume, when we adopt it, we don’t approve or disapprove the person whose character we are judging just by considering the relation that we have with him or her. Rather, we sympathize with the “narrow circle” (T 3.3.3.2; SBN 602) of those who have any relation with him or her, and who are affected in a positive or negative way by that person’s character. From the common point of view, a trait of character will be considered virtuous if it is either immediately agreeable to oneself or to others, or useful to oneself or to others (T 3.3.1.30; SBN 591). Otherwise, if it is immediately disagreeable to oneself or to others, or harmful to oneself or to others, it will be considered vicious. Such a common point of view is the result for Hume of “the force of many sympathies” (EPM 9.11; SBN 276), that is, it is a shared point of view that results from a continuing debate, sentimentally supported, among human beings in the course of time. Hume believes that, thanks to sympathy, human beings are capable of feeling what others feel, and thus of converging on a viewpoint that harmonizes a multiplicity of different, subjective perspectives.

If what I’ve said so far is persuasive, Humean subjectivism is not doomed to fall into relativism. On the contrary, in Hume’s sentimental account of morality, objectivity can be explained in terms of intersubjectivity: ethics can be said to be objective since it results from human beings adopting a sympathetically reinforced point of view from which they can define virtues and vices, and express moral judgments that can both be recognized as such and move them accordingly. This solution might be considered by some not to really solve the problem; intersubjectivity is not objectivity, after all. Nevertheless, what I would like to stress is that criticizing Hume for lacking a standard of moral judgment because of his subjectivism doesn’t really hit the mark. Hume, and the Humean virtue ethics

¹⁸ I do that in *Preserving Practicality: In Defense of Hume’s Sympathy-Based Ethics*, in R. Vitz, P.A. Reed (eds.), *Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology*, Routledge, London-New York 2018, pp. 170-190.

I'm trying to depict, do offer such a standard. Even if it is subjectivist, Hume's virtue ethics does make use of a point of view of morality that allows us to identify virtues and vices, and to formulate moral judgments, that are not reducible to subjective expressions of one's feelings¹⁹.

3. *The Perfect Character*

Also, Hume offers a sound description of the moral agent. Given Hume's appeal to sympathy as a principle that puts human beings in connection at a sentimental level, Hume's virtuous agent is far from being an isolated subject independent of others. On the contrary, the Humean virtuous agent is defined, and expresses herself, within a communal dimension of social connections. This appeal to the larger community in which the virtuous agent is placed and acts might, once again, remind us of a neo-Aristotelian approach²⁰. However, this is only in part. The Humean virtuous agent does need to be in relation with other human beings, but this doesn't mean that by doing this she fulfills her natural potential as a proper human being; as I said, in Hume there is no final end of human nature we can appeal to. In addition, the Humean virtuous agent is not the one who presents in herself all the virtues at once; Hume's virtue ethics is centered on the virtues, but there is no unity of them. The Humean virtue ethical proposal is distinct from the neo-Aristotelian one in virtue of its lacking final causes, and of any model of the virtuous person

¹⁹ It may be objected that Hume's ethics is dependent upon the mere fact that a community of individuals actually adopts sound moral standards; that being so, how can we morally assess a whole moral community that is based on weird or wrong moral practices? This is a serious issue. Here I just underline the fact that for Hume the community of individuals ideally comprehends the whole of humanity; Hume talks of "the *party* of human kind" (EPM 9.9; SBN 275) as it reveals itself in human history. The point of view of moral judgment is not limited to the community local to us. We can sympathize with other people far away from us in space and time and imagine their condition; this gives us the reflective resources to evaluate and criticize communities that are based on weird or wrong moral practices, as well as our own community. True, this moral viewpoint is the result of that very same sympathetic process. In this sense, it is always *internal* to human practices. However, protesting that there must be an external viewpoint independent of the concrete and contingent experience we have of human characters and practices, from which those very characters and practices can be objectively assessed, runs the risk of appearing question-begging, and eventually illusory. I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this problem.

²⁰ Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, relates Hume to Aristotle on these lines. See A. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Duckworth, London 1988, pp. 298 and 321.

conceived as the *phronimos*. Rather, Hume talks of a “perfect” character:

when we enumerate the good qualities of any person, we always mention those parts of his character, which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father. We consider him with all his relations in society; and love or hate him, according as he affects those, who have any immediate intercourse with him. And 'tis a most certain rule, that if there be no relation of life, in which I cou'd not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allow'd to be perfect. If he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue. (T 3.3.3.9; SBN 606)

Even though Hume uses the term “perfect”, this doesn't mean that the perfect agent is an ideal agent, for the perfect agent can be said to be so only as the outcome of the always-revisable sympathetic relations among people. The notion of perfection here has nothing to do with that perfectionism which is instead the hallmark of many neo-Aristotelian conceptions of human nature. The measure for judging the agent's perfection is not taken for granted in Hume, but it is itself the upshot of these relations. In this sense, there is no ideal of human excellence that can be specified in advance of the sympathetic relations among human beings. And it is the case that these relations are highly dependent on chance. It is true that Hume talks of a human nature that remains stable (see EPM A Dialogue). However, human nature doesn't work like an ideal for him; as in the case of the principle of sympathy, human nature too is a generalization emerging from those very relations.

4. *Contingent Pluralism*

This last point is pivotal in marking a further difference between the Humean and the neo-Aristotelian versions of virtue ethics. With respect to the neo-Aristotelian version, the Humean one depends on experience in a more radical way: for the latter, in fact, the very touchstone for assessing virtue and vice arises from the interaction between human nature and the circumstances in which people find themselves. The kind of virtue ethics that follows from all this might result in something less appealing and, in a way, less elegant than the neo-Aristotelian one. After all, Hume's virtue ethics doesn't put forward a model of virtuous conduct that can be validated in advance of and independently from the fortuitous ways in which hu-

man nature unfolds in the course of human affairs. Various Hume scholars admit that this produces a kind of “pluralism”²¹ in which virtues and vices don’t find their place in a single unified ranking. Because of that, many neo-Aristotelians criticize Hume’s virtue ethics as too dependent on contingency²². However, this is far from being a defect: by being closer to an empirically tested picture of human nature that is in line with the results of contemporary experimental psychology²³, Hume’s version of virtue ethics offers a more realistic image of what it means to act morally, an image that, I believe, is also ethically fairer.

5. Conclusion

In this essay I’ve discussed some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that make it different from the neo-Aristotelian one. I’ve stressed some of its characteristics – its focus on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlighted its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I’ve done that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or vicious characters²⁴.

²¹ See E. Frykholm, *art. cit.*; M. Gill, *Humean Moral Pluralism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014; L. Greco, *Toward a Humean Virtue Ethics*, cit., Christine Swanton, *Virtue Ethics*, cit.

²² It is the case of the aforementioned Annas, Foot, and Hursthouse.

²³ See M.W. Merritt, *Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology*, in «Ethical Theory and Moral Practice», 3 (2000), pp. 363-383, and M.W. Merritt, J.M. Doris, G. Harman, *Character*, in J.M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group, *The Moral Psychology Handbook*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 355-401. See also L. Besser, *Eudaimonic Ethics: The Philosophy and Psychology of Living Well*, Routledge, London-New York 2014, ch. 5; V. Tiberius, *Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction*, Routledge, London-New York 2015, ch. 7.

²⁴ I would like to thank Roger Crisp, James Knight, Eugenio Lecaldano, Dan O’Brien, and two anonymous referees for their helpful observations.

Abstract

In this essay I discuss some elements of Hume's virtue ethics that distinguishes it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume's virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or vicious characters.

Keywords: Hume; Aristotle; virtues and vices; character; subjectivism; moral pluralism.

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